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I.  INTRODUCTION 
More than twenty years ago, in Smith v. Cote, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court held ―that New Hampshire recognizes a cause of action for 
wrongful birth.‖1  After so holding, the court then discussed the damages 
available to a prevailing wrongful-birth plaintiff.  Among other things, the 
court held that when parental emotional distress associated with raising a 
disabled child, born after the mother had received negligent pre-natal as-
surance of the baby‘s normal health, ―results in tangible pecuniary losses, 
such as medical expenses or counseling fees, such losses are recoverable.‖2  
The court further held that a wrongful-birth plaintiff may not recover in-
tangible damages for the ongoing emotional distress associated with rais-
ing a disabled child who was carried to term as a result of negligent pre-
natal care.
3
  However, because it was not raised on appeal, the Smith opi-
nion did not address an alternative basis for recovering emotional-distress 
  
 * Adjunct Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center.  Law Clerk to Judge Steven J. McAuliffe of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. 
 1. 128 N.H. 231, 242, 513 A.2d 341, 348 (1986). 
 2. Id. at 245–46, 513 A.2d at 350 (citing Holyoke v. Grand Trunk Ry., 48 N.H. 541 (1869); Ri-
chard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making “the 
Punishment Fit the Crime,” 1 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1979)). 
 3. Smith, 128 N.H. at 247, 513 A.2d at 351. 
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damages—Linda Smith‘s claim under Corso v. Merrill4 for the emotional 
distress associated with witnessing the birth of her disabled daughter after 
she had been assured that her daughter would be born healthy.  I argue that 
while it seems unlikely that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would 
give wrongful-birth plaintiffs a Corso claim, the court, if presented with 
the correct legal question, could well rule that wrongful-birth plaintiffs 
may recover for the emotional distress they suffer as a result of witnessing 
the birth of an unexpectedly disabled child. 
I begin with a brief discussion of the facts of Smith and the nature of a 
cause of action for wrongful birth.  Next I examine the salient points of 
Corso and describe the parental-bystander doctrine the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court adopted in that case.  In the following section, I assay the 
application of Corso to Smith, both as a logical matter and in terms of case 
law from other jurisdictions.  Finally, I reframe the question from the one 
posed by the pleadings in Smith, i.e., whether a wrongful-birth plaintiff 
also has a Corso claim, and address the question that really matters: 
whether a wrongful-birth plaintiff in New Hampshire can recover for the 
emotional distress associated with witnessing the birth of an unexpectedly 
disabled child.  Based upon both out-of-state authority and New Hamp-
shire precedent, I conclude that a wrongful-birth plaintiff in New Hamp-
shire should be able recover such damages even without a Corso claim. 
II.  SMITH V. COTE 
The plaintiffs in Smith were a mother and her daughter.  The defendant 
was the mother‘s physician.  The relevant facts are these: 
 
Plaintiff Linda J. Smith became pregnant early in 1979.  During 
the course of her pregnancy Linda was under the care of the defen-
dants, physicians who specialize in obstetrics and gynecology.  
Linda consulted the defendants on April 8, 1979, complaining of 
nausea, abdominal pain and a late menstrual period.  The defen-
dants prescribed Keflex, an antibiotic, and recommended that Lin-
da undergo a pregnancy test if her menstrual period did not begin.  
Two days later, Linda again consulted the defendants, complaining 
of an itchy rash and a slight fever.  The defendants diagnosed Lin-
da‘s condition as an allergic reaction to Keflex.  Some time the-
reafter, the defendants determined that she was pregnant. 
 
  
 4. 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979). 
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On August 3, 1979, nearly four months after the April visits, 
Linda underwent a rubella titre test at the direction of the defen-
dants.  The test indicated that Linda had been exposed to rubella.  





Subsequently, Linda‘s daughter, Heather, was born with congenital rubella 
syndrome.
6
  Thereafter, Linda and Heather filed suit: 
 
They allege[d] that Linda contracted rubella early in her pregnancy 
and that, while she was under the defendants‘ care, the defendants 
negligently failed to test for and discover in a timely manner her 
exposure to the disease.  The plaintiffs further contend[ed] that the 
defendants negligently failed to advise Linda of the potential for 
birth defects in a fetus exposed to rubella, thereby depriving her of 
the knowledge necessary to an informed decision as to whether to 
give birth to a potentially impaired child. . . .  
 
The plaintiffs [did] not allege that the defendants caused Linda 
to conceive her child or to contract rubella, or that the defendants 
could have prevented the effects of the disease on the fetus.  Ra-
ther, the plaintiffs contend[ed] that if Linda had known of the risks 




The Smith plaintiffs sued, asserting three counts.  Linda asserted claims for 
wrongful birth (Count I) and negligent infliction of emotional distress un-
der the parental-bystander doctrine set out in Corso (Count II), while 
Heather asserted a claim for wrongful life (Count III).
8
  In connection with 
her wrongful-birth claim, Linda sought damages for the emotional distress 
associated with caring for and raising her disabled daughter.
9
  In Count II, 
her Corso claim, Linda sought damages ―for the emotional injury, includ-
ing depression, attributable to the impact of her observation of Heather‘s 
defects at and after Heather‘s birth.‖10 
Ruling on an interlocutory appeal that involved only the first and third 
claims,
11
 the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized a cause of action 
  
 5. Smith, 128 N.H. at 234, 513 A.2d at 342. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 234, 513 A.2d at 342–43. 
 8. Id. at 234–35, 513 A.2d at 343. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 235, 513 A.2d at 343. 
 11. Id. at 235, 513 A.2d at 343.  Regarding the plaintiffs‘ second claim, negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, the Smith court explained: 
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for wrongful birth
12
 and discussed the damages available thereunder,
13
 but 
declined to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life, explaining that 
―[w]e will not recognize a right not to be born, and we will not permit a 
person to recover damages from one who has done him no harm.‖14 
Regarding the availability of intangible damages for the emotional dis-
tress associated with raising a disabled child who was carried to term be-
cause of negligent prenatal care provided to the mother, the court first ob-
served that ―[e]xisting damages principles do not resolve the issue whether 
recovery for emotional distress should be permitted in wrongful birth cas-
es,‖15 and then held that such damages are not recoverable.16  The court 
  
In Count II, Linda seeks damages, under the parental bystander doctrine enunciated in Cor-
so v. Merrill for the emotional injury, including depression, attributable to the impact of her 
observation of Heather‘s defects at and after Heather‘s birth.  The validity of Count II is not 
among the transferred questions, and we express no opinion as to this aspect of the writ. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 12. Id. at 242, 513 A.2d at 348.  The question presented concerning the existence of a cause of 
action for wrongful birth was this: 
Will New Hampshire Law recognize a wrongful birth cause of action by the mother of a 
wilfully conceived baby suffering from birth defects, against a physician on the grounds that 
the physician negligently failed to test for and discover that the mother had rubella, failed to 
advise the mother as to the risks of potential birth defects in a fetus exposed to rubella, and 
thereby deprived the mother of the information on which she would have had an abortion to 
prevent the birth of her deformed child, where the physician did not cause the baby‘s con-
ception, and did not cause the deformities in the unborn fetus? 
Id. at 235, 513 A.2d at 343. 
 13. Id. at 242–47, 513 A.2d at 348–51. 
 14. Id. at 252, 513 A.2d at 355.  The question presented concerning the existence of a cause of 
action for wrongful life was this: 
Will New Hampshire law recognize a cause of action for wrongful life brought by a minor 
child suffering from birth defects against a physician on the grounds that the physician neg-
ligently failed to test for, discover, and advise the child‘s mother as to the mother‘s having 
rubella and as to information concerning the potential effects of rubella on her unborn fetus, 
which failure allegedly caused the mother not to abort the fetus, thereby causing the plaintiff 
child to live and exist with mental and physical deformities? 
Smith, 128 N.H. at 235–36, 513 A.2d at 343. 
 15. Id. at 246, 513 A.2d at 350.  But see Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ind. 2000) 
(eschewing the specification of damages unique to wrongful-birth cause of action and applying general 
principles of tort law to determine appropriate measure of damages); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 
114 (Pa. 1981) (using ―the usual common-law principles of damages‖ to determine that because wrong-
ful-birth plaintiffs‘ ―alleged injury (mental distress at having to be the parent of a defective, diseased 
child) was foreseeable, mental distress damages should be recoverable also‖). 
 16. Smith, 128 N.H. at 247, 513 A.2d at 351 (citing Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)) (―The claim for past and future emotional pain and suffering resulting from the 
birth of Justin were [sic] properly stricken [by the trial court] on the basis of the impact doctrine.‖); 
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. 1978) (―[C]alculation of damages for plaintiffs‘ emo-
tional injuries remains too speculative to permit recovery notwithstanding the breach of a duty flowing 
from defendants to themselves.‖); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (characterizing 
emotional distress damages as ―an award based upon speculation as to the . . . pluses and minuses of 
parental mind and emotion‖).  The Becker court, which, like the Smith court, determined wrongful life 
not to be a cognizable cause of action, added this fillip to its discussion of emotional distress damages 
in wrongful-birth cases: ―As in the case of plaintiffs‘ causes of action for damages on behalf of their 
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based its ruling on, among other things, ―the need to establish a clearly 
defined limit to the scope of negligence liability in this area.‖17  Because 
the mother in Smith distinguished between the emotional injury she suf-
fered as a result of witnessing the birth of her child and the emotional dis-
tress she had suffered and expected to suffer as a consequence of raising 
her child—seeking damages for the former in a Corso claim and damages 
for the latter in her wrongful-birth claim—whether or not a wrongful-birth 
plaintiff can recover emotional-distress damages for witnessing the birth of 
an unexpectedly disabled child is an unsettled question of New Hampshire 
law.  Moreover, thanks to the way the Smith plaintiffs pleaded their case, 
the foregoing question is, in the first instance, framed in terms of whether a 
wrongful-birth plaintiff may also maintain a Corso claim. 
III.  CORSO V. MERRILL 
The second count in Smith, the one that was not before the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court on appeal, was Linda Smith‘s claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress under the parental-bystander doctrine 
enunciated in Corso. 
The plaintiffs in Corso were a mother and father whose eight-year-old 
daughter was struck by a car and permanently crippled.
18
  The circums-
tances of the accident were these: 
 
The Corso house was approximately fifty feet from the scene of 
the accident.  Lolita Corso was in her kitchen at the time of the ac-
cident and she heard a ―terrible thud‖ outside the house.  After 
hearing this sound, she looked out the kitchen door and saw her 
daughter lying seriously injured in the street in front of the house.  
Vincent Corso was also in the kitchen when he heard his wife 
scream that Katherine had been hit by a car.  He immediately ran 





infants for wrongful life, the cognizability of their actions for emotional harm is a question best left for 
legislative address.‖  Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 814. 
 17. Smith, 128 N.H. at 246, 513 A.2d at 351.  As the court further acknowledged: ―Every injury has 
ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end.  The problem for the law is to 
limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.‖  Id. (quoting Nutter v. Frisbie Mem‘l 
Hosp., 124 N.H. 791, 794, 474 A.2d 584, 586 (1984)). 
 18. Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 649, 406 A.2d 300, 302 (1979). 
 19. Id. 
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Based on the foregoing, both parents sought recovery for, among other 
things, negligent infliction of emotional distress.
20
  The trial court dis-
missed the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, ruling that 
they failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted.
21
  In 
reversing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court abandoned the zone-of-
danger rule,
22
 under which recovery would have been unavailable to the 
Corsos, and held that ―a mother and father who witness or contempora-
neously sensorially perceive a serious injury to their child may recover if 
they suffer serious mental and emotional harm that is accompanied by ob-
jective physical symptoms.‖23  As the court further explained: 
 
The emotional injury must be directly attributable to the emotional 
impact of the plaintiff‘s observation or contemporaneous sensory 
perception of the accident and immediate viewing of the accident 
victim.  Therefore, recovery will not be permitted for emotional 
distress when the plaintiff is merely informed of the matter after 
the accident or for the grief that may follow from the death of the 
related accident victim. . . .  The test of foreseeability requires a 
relatively close connection in both time and geography between 




In Corso, as in its subsequent opinion in Smith, the court expressed an in-
clination to avoid subjecting defendants to unlimited liability.
25
 
IV.  SMITH VS. CORSO 
Having described Smith and Corso, I now return to the question that 
animates this article: would the New Hampshire Supreme Court, if pre-
sented with the question, allow a plaintiff with a wrongful-birth claim to 
pursue an additional claim under the parental-bystander doctrine enun-
ciated in Corso?  This is an academic question with practical consequences 
  
 20. Id. at 650, 406 A.2d at 302. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 659, 406 A.2d at 308.  In place of the zone-of-danger rule, the Corso court adopted a 
version of the rule announced by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 
1968). 
 23. Id. at 659, 406 A.2d at 308. 
 24. Id. at 656–57, 406 A.2d at 306 (citing Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031–32 (Cal. 1977); 
Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); D‘Ambra v. United States, 
338 A.2d 524, 529 n.5 (R.I. 1975)). 
 25. Corso, 119 N.H. at 653, 406 A.2d at 304. 
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The argument for giving a Corso claim to a plaintiff such as the mother 
in Smith goes something like this.  The mother in Corso suffered emotional 
distress as a result of hearing her daughter being struck by a car, while the 
father suffered emotional distress as a result of seeing his injured daughter 
lying in the street immediately after she was hit.  In many wrongful-birth 
cases, a parent reasonably expecting the birth of a healthy child suffers 
emotional distress when he or she witnesses the delivery of a child with 
recognizable disabilities.  In both situations, the parent claiming emotional-
distress damages can establish proximity in time and space to the event that 
has caused his or her emotional distress. 
Moreover, it does not seem that allowing wrongful-birth plaintiffs a 
Corso claim would run afoul of the New Hampshire Supreme Court‘s most 
clearly stated concern in both Smith and Corso: the unlimited spread of 
liability beyond any reasonable boundary.
27
  Recovery could be limited to 
a parent who suffers serious mental and emotional harm accompanied by 
objective physical symptoms as a result of witnessing the birth of a child 
with recognizable disabilities after the mother had received negligent pre-
natal care and advice that caused the parents to reasonably expect the birth 
of a healthy child.  A wrongful-birth Corso claim would be limited to par-
ents, as opposed to more distant relatives, and would bar recovery for a 
parent who only learned of his or her child‘s condition at some time after 
the moment of delivery.  As the Michigan Court of Appeals explained in 
affirming the trial court‘s dismissal of a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress in Taylor v. Kurapati,
28
 under a rule very similar to that 
stated in Corso: 
 
The Taylors‘ claim is fatally flawed where both the parents ac-
knowledged that they did not see their child‘s disabilities at or im-
mediately after her birth.  Brandy Taylor‘s deposition testimony 
indicated that she did not know anything was wrong with Shelby 
Taylor and that the doctors swept the child out of the room before 
  
 26. Cf. Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming, over plaintiff‘s claim of 
insufficiency, award of $200,000 for the emotional distress caused by the parents‘ ―loss of the right to 
decide whether to have a child who potentially may suffer birth defects‖); Chamberland v. Physicians 
for Women‘s Health, LLC, No. CV010164040S, 2006 WL 437553, at *1, *9–*10 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 8, 2006) (denying defendant‘s motion for remittitur after jury awarded wrongful-birth plaintiffs $7 
million for their emotional distress); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 828, 833 (Va. 1982) (affirm-
ing jury award of $150,000 for emotional distress under a wrongful-birth claim). 
 27. See Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 247, 513 A.2d 341, 351 (1986); Corso, 119 N.H. at 653, 406 
A.2d at 304. 
 28. 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
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she had the chance to see her.  Brian Taylor testified that he no-
ticed something about Shelby Taylor‘s arm, but that the child was 
taken out of the room before he could notice more of the disabili-
ties.  The Taylors‘ physician was able to discuss the child‘s disabil-
ities with the Taylors before they saw her.  The undisputed facts of 





Thus, a Corso claim in the context of wrongful birth would be every bit as 
circumscribed as any other Corso claim,
30
 satisfying the Smith court‘s con-




One argument against giving wrongful-birth plaintiffs a Corso claim is 
the fact that the tortious act in a wrongful-birth case—the medical negli-
gence that causes a woman to carry a baby with disabilities to term—
generally takes place a trimester or two before the delivery itself.  Argua-
bly, that is enough to undermine the contemporaneity element of a Corso 
claim, notwithstanding that under normal circumstances the moment of 
delivery is a parent‘s first opportunity to learn of the mother‘s doctor‘s 
negligence.  The Kansas Supreme Court noted the lack of contemporaneity 
when it held that ―damages for emotional distress of the parents are not 
recoverable in a wrongful birth case,‖32 and went on to explain: 
 
  
 29. Id. at 693 (citing Wargelin v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 385 N.W.2d 732, 737–38 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1986)). 
  In a similar vein, in a case in which the Alaska Supreme Court seems to have endorsed the idea 
that a mother could have a bystander claim when her minor daughter‘s physician failed to diagnose the 
daughter‘s pregnancy, recovery was determined to be unavailable due to a lack of temporal proximity: 
Under Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 365–66 (Alaska 1987), a bys-
tander claim is permissible when a person closely related to a tort victim and in near prox-
imity to the scene of the negligent injury suffers severe and foreseeable emotional distress 
due to ―shock result[ing] more or less contemporaneously with,‖ or ―follow[ing] closely on 
the heels of,‖ the injury‘s discovery.  Here, M.A. [the mother] was not in close proximity to 
J.A. [the daughter], either at the time of the alleged misdiagnosis or when J.A. subsequently 
learned of her pregnancy; M.A.‘s eventual ―shock,‖ if any, does not appear to have occurred 
contemporaneously with her daughter‘s discovery of the injury; and there is no indication 
that the immediate ―shock‖ came in response to the alleged injury—the lateness of the preg-
nancy‘s discovery—rather than to discovery of the pregnancy itself. 
M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 856 (Alaska 1998) (first two alterations in original). 
 30. See Nutter v. Frisbie Mem‘l Hosp., 124 N.H. 791, 796, 474 A.2d 584, 587 (1984) (instructing 
trial court to dismiss plaintiffs‘ Corso claim when parents were told of daughter‘s death in emergency 
room immediately afterward and were taken to see her body, but were not present at the moment of her 
death). 
 31. See Smith, 128 N.H. at 247, 513 A.2d at 351. 
 32. Arche v. U.S. Dep‘t of the Army, 798 P.2d 477, 482 (Kan. 1990). 
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The rule in Kansas is that plaintiffs can sustain a cause of ac-
tion for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by the in-
juries of a third party only if they were witnesses to the occurrence 
which caused the injury.  We have thus far held that visibility of 
results as opposed to visibility of the tortious act does not give rise 
to a claim for emotional damages.  The child‘s injury in this case 
occurred without human fault during development of the fetus; the 
parents were not aware of the injury at the time.  The parents in 
Schmeck were responsible for their disabled child and suffered 
emotional distress because of the disablement, but were denied re-
covery for emotional distress.  We see no reason why a wrongful 




 33. Id.; cf. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 1992) (holding that Florida statute of repose 
―runs from the date negligent advice was given, not from the date of [disabled child‘s] birth‖); Taylor, 
600 N.W.2d at 692 (holding, under state statute, that wrongful-birth claim, as a species of medical 
malpractice, accrues at the time of the doctor‘s act or omission ―regardless of the time the plaintiff 
discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim‖). 
  On the other hand, Judge Hughes of the Virginia Circuit Court has ruled, in the context of a 
statute-of-limitations defense, that a cause of action for wrongful birth accrues upon the birth of the 
child, rather than at the time the mother‘s physician commits malpractice: 
A cause of action for personal injury accrues on the date of the injury.  [VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-230 (2007).]  Negligent infliction of emotion distress based on a ―wrongful 
birth‖ was recognized in Naccash v. Burger, [290 S.E.2d 825] ([Va.] 1982) (action for 
wrongful birth of child afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease).  There, the court said that the in-
jury occurred when the doctors delivered the erroneous, prenatal medical diagnosis to the 
parents.  Id. at [830].  However, the Court has not directly decided the statute of limitations 
question in the wrongful birth context.  The defendant cites analogous medical malpractice 
cases on ―failure to diagnose‖ for the proposition that the date of injury is the date on which 
the problem develops into ―a more serious condition which poses greater danger to the pa-
tient or which requires more extensive treatment.‖  George v. Pariser, [484 S.E.2d 888] 
([Va.] 1997) (citing DeBoer v. Brown, 673 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. 1983)) (injury occurred 
when cancerous melanoma changed from benign to malignant status, allowing the cancer to 
metastasize and recur).  The ―more serious injury,‖ as envisioned by the defendant, is Mrs. 
Santowasso‘s inability to legally abort her pregnancy, even if she had been informed that the 
twins were conjoined. 
The court declines to adopt the Pariser date of injury test to the circumstances of the 
instant case.  ―The statutory word ‗injury‘ means positive, physical or mental hurt to the 
claimant, not legal wrong to him in the broad sense that his legally protected interests have 
been invaded . . . .‖  Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., [275 S.E.2d 900, 904] ([Va.] 1981) 
(emphasis added) [sic].  See also Nunnally v. Artis, [292 S.E.2d 126, 128] ([Va.] 1997).  No 
positive, physical or mental hurt could have accrued at the time that the defendants‘ alleged-
ly negligent treatment deprived the plaintiffs‘ of their opportunity to terminate the pregnan-
cy, e.g., the end of the second trimester.  The court finds that the cause of action accrued, 
and the damage developed, on the date that the plaintiffs became aware of their childrens‘ 
[sic] disorders—the birth date of the defective child, September 15, 1994.  ―Before the birth 
of a child, the plaintiffs had only a potential claim because the loss of the opportunity to ab-
ort is of no consequence unless the pregnancy results in a live birth. . . . [T]he cause of ac-
tion is for the birth of a defective child in contravention of the parents‘ right to abort as a re-
sult of the defendants‘ alleged negligence; it is not the mere tortious deprivation of the right 
to abort, without more.‖  Barnes v. Head, [No. 114928, 1993 WL 945979, at *5–*6] ([Va. 
Cir. Ct. Feb. 25,] 1993) (emphasis added) [sic].  The extent of the childrens‘ [sic] defects 
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There is a second, even more compelling argument against giving 
wrongful-birth plaintiffs a Corso claim.  In a Corso claim, a parent‘s cause 
of action is derivative of the child‘s.  That is, the daughter in Corso had 
claims against the driver who hit her.
34
  By contrast, the doctor in Smith did 
no harm to Linda Smith‘s daughter, as the court observed when it decided 
not to recognize the tort of wrongful life.
35
  Without a wrongful act being 
committed against the child in a wrongful-birth case, i.e., in the absence of 
a cause of action for wrongful life, it is difficult to see how the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court could allow the parents to pursue a Corso 
claim; parents asserting wrongful-birth claims simply have not ―wit-
ness[ed] or contemporaneously sensorially perceive[d] a serious injury to 
their child.‖36  What they have witnessed is their child‘s delivery, but in 
New Hampshire, under Smith, a child can never be injured by his or her 
own birth.  Without an injury to a child, the necessary factual predicate for 
a Corso parental-bystander claim simply does not exist; with no injury to 
observe, there can be no bystander.  Before there could be an injury for a 
wrongful-birth plaintiff to observe, the New Hampshire Supreme Court (or 
the legislature) would have to overrule Smith and recognize a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful life.  That seems improbable. 
Not only does logic argue against giving a wrongful-birth plaintiff a 
Corso claim, so too does out-of-state case law, which either rejects the 
possibility of such a claim outright or allows Corso-like claims in circums-
tances sufficiently dissimilar to the situation in Smith that the opinions 
allowing such claims seem unlikely to inspire the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court to give a Corso claim to a wrongful-birth plaintiff. 
First of all, and most directly, in Quinn v. Blau,
37
 Judge Stodolink of 
the Connecticut Superior Court granted the defendants‘ motion to dismiss 
the wrongful-birth plaintiffs‘ claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, brought under the Connecticut equivalent to Corso.
38
  Moreover, 
courts have pointed out both that ―[t]he nature of the tort of wrongful birth 
  
was not revealed despite repeated sonograms by the defendants; it only became apparent 
once the twins were born conjoined and required extensive medical care.  As the Motion for 
Judgment was filed on September 12, 1996, this is within the two year statute of limitations. 
Santowasso v. Zedler, Nos. LB-2316-1 & LB-2317-1, 1998 WL 972091, at *2–*3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 
1998). 
 34. Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 650, 406 A.2d 300, 302 (1979). 
 35. Smith, 128 N.H. at 252, 513 A.2d at 354. 
 36. Corso, 119 N.H. at 659, 406 A.2d at 308. 
 37. No. CV96325691S, 1997 WL 781874 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1997). 
 38. Id. at *9.  In so ruling, Judge Stodolink recognized that the Connecticut Corso equivalent, Clo-
hessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852 (Conn. 1996), was decided after, and did not overrule, Maloney v. 
Conroy, 545 A.2d 1059 (Conn. 1988), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a bystander to 
medical malpractice may not recover for emotional distress.  Quinn, 1997 WL 781874, at *9. 
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has nothing to do with whether a defendant caused the injury or harm to 
the child,‖39 and that a mother giving birth is not a bystander to anything; 
she is a participant.
40
  In its opinion recognizing a cause of action for 
wrongful birth, Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital,
41
 the Illinois 
Supreme Court expressly declined to give wrongful-birth plaintiffs a cause 
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
42
 and the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Cauman v. 
George Washington University.
43
  But because Siemieniec and Cauman 
were decided in zone-of-danger jurisdictions rather than jurisdictions ap-
plying the parental-bystander doctrine of Dillon v. Legg,
44
 the opinions in 
those cases have limited value as guides to how the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court would regard a wrongful-birth plaintiff‘s Corso claim, given 




Standing in opposition to Quinn are two cases in which courts have 
given a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress to the 
parents of a child born with disabilities after the mother had received neg-
ligent pre-natal care, but neither case appears to provide a solid basis for 
giving New Hampshire wrongful-birth plaintiffs a Corso claim. 
In Taylor v. Kurapati,
46
 the Michigan Court of Appeals allowed the 
parents of a child born with negligently undiagnosed femur-fibula-ulna 
syndrome to pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
and did so under the parental-bystander doctrine.
47
  However, that court 
  
 39. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993). 
 40. See, e.g., Rich v. Foye, No. X01UWYCV065003443S, 2007 WL 2702809, at *7 (Conn. Super 
Ct. Aug. 28, 2007) (―Jason Rich and Keri Rich are not bystanders and thus are entitled to seek damages 
for emotional distress that is found to be a direct and proximate result of the defendants‘ negligence.‖); 
Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) (―[W]e believe it would be wholly unrealistic to 
say that the Burgers were mere witnesses to the consequences of the tortious conduct involved in this 
case.‖); see also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 492–93 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing that 
statute allowing parents to recover for injuries to their children was not directly relevant to question of 
parents‘ right to emotional distress damages in wrongful birth action because ―a wrongful birth claim 
does not allege injury to the child as the cause of the parents‘ injury; rather it alleges the birth of the 
child is the cause of the injury‖). 
 41. 512 N.E.2d 691, 705–06 (Ill. 1987). 
 42. Id. at 707. 
 43. 630 A.2d 1104, 1107 (D.C. 1993).  After identifying the District of Columbia as a zone-of-
danger jurisdiction, the court observed: 
There is no claim in the instant case that the conduct of either doctor or either hospital 
caused physical injury to anyone.  Hence there is no way to read the complaint as alleging 
that appellants witnessed injury to an immediate family member, or that they were in a 
―zone of physical danger,‖ or that appellees‘ negligence caused them to fear for their safety. 
Id. at 1106 (footnote omitted). 
 44. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
 45. Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 658–59, 406 A.2d 300, 307–08 (1979). 
 46. 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
 47. Id. at 693. 
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was operating in a legal environment very different from that of New 
Hampshire.  Just before holding that the Taylor plaintiffs were entitled to 
pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court 
―conclude[d] that this intermediate appellate court should not continue to 
recognize the wrongful birth tort without the slightest hint of approval 
from the Michigan Supreme Court or our Legislature.‖48  Thus, in Michi-
gan—but not in New Hampshire—negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress was the only available cause of action for plaintiffs such as Linda 
Smith.  The availability of a cause of action for wrongful birth in New 
Hampshire would seem to cut against the applicability of Taylor.  At least 
two states have allowed recovery under the parental-bystander doctrine in 
medical malpractice actions for stillbirth,
49
 but since the medical negli-
gence in a typical stillbirth case takes place much closer to the time of de-
livery than the medical negligence in a typical wrongful-birth case, the 
stillbirth cases provide weak support, if any, for giving wrongful-birth 
plaintiffs a Corso claim. 
In Santowasso v. Zedler,
50
 a Virginia trial court, relying on Naccash v. 
Burger, allowed wrongful-birth plaintiffs to pursue a tandem claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress,
51
 but because Virginia adhered to 
the impact rule at the time that case was decided, the Santowasso plaintiffs 
did not get a claim under the parental-bystander doctrine, which makes 
Santowasso plainly inapplicable to New Hampshire.  Moreover, given that 
Naccash, unlike Smith, allows wrongful-birth plaintiffs to recover intangi-
ble damages for emotional distress and does not distinguish between the 
emotional distress associated with witnessing the birth of a disabled child 
and the emotional distress associated with raising that child, it is not entire-
ly clear what was added to the Santowasso plaintiffs‘ case by pleading a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in addition to their 
wrongful-birth claim. 
In sum, both a comparison of the cause of action established by Corso 
to the typical wrongful-birth fact pattern and the case law from other states 
suggest, rather strongly, that the New Hampshire Supreme Court, if pre-
  
 48. Id. at 691.  At least two other courts have gone the other way, ruling that state statutes barring 
wrongful-birth claims also barred claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress when the factual 
predicate for emotional-distress claim is essentially the same as that for a wrongful-birth claim.  See 
VanVooren v. Astin, 111 P.3d 125, 128, 129 (Idaho 2005); Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 
436, 449–50 (Utah 2002).  In both of those cases, the plaintiffs asserted claims for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress expressly to avoid their states‘ statutory bans on wrongful-birth claims. 
 49. See Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 142–43 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & 
Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 365 S.E.2d 909, 917–19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
 50. Nos. LB-2316-1 & LB-2317-1, 1998 WL 972091 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1998). 
 51. Id. at *3. 
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sented with the question, would decline to give wrongful-birth plaintiffs a 
Corso claim. 
V.  BEYOND SMITH VS. CORSO 
Viewed one way, the likely unavailability of a Corso claim for wrong-
ful-birth plaintiffs in New Hampshire could be seen as foreclosing recov-
ery of the damages Linda Smith sought in Count II of the suit underlying 
the Smith opinion.  But, it is important to bear in mind that the question of 
whether or not a Corso claim is available to wrongful-birth plaintiffs is 
entirely an artifact of the litigation of Smith.  By expressly dividing emo-
tional distress into two categories—that caused by witnessing the birth of a 
disabled child and that caused by raising that child—Linda Smith did 
something relatively unusual.  In the vast majority of the wrongful-birth 
cases I have examined, emotional distress has been treated both by plain-
tiffs and by courts as an undifferentiated whole.
52
  The advantage of Linda 
Smith‘s litigation strategy is that the Smith court‘s decision to bar the re-
covery of emotional-distress damages in wrongful-birth cases was limited 
to the emotional distress resulting from raising an unexpectedly disabled 
child.  By its own terms, Smith does not bar recovery of damages for the 
emotional distress associated with witnessing the birth of that child.  The 
disadvantage was that by relying on Corso, Linda Smith may have short-
changed herself by framing her claim unnecessarily narrowly, and in a way 
that would likely bar recovery, for the reasons I have already discussed. 
Freed from the limitations imposed by Linda Smith‘s reliance on Cor-
so, however, the operative question can be rephrased: notwithstanding the 
unavailability of damages to wrongful-birth plaintiffs for the emotional 
distress resulting from raising a child with unexpected disabilities, would 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court allow a successful wrongful-birth 
plaintiff to recover damages for the emotional distress resulting from wit-
nessing the birth of a child who is, unexpectedly, disabled?  Foreign au-
thority, buttressed by New Hampshire case law, suggests an answer in the 
affirmative. 
Of course, the strongest foundation for a decision allowing the damag-
es Linda Smith sought in Count II would be an out-of-state opinion that is 
  
 52. See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 
656 P.2d 483, 493 (Wash. 1983) (holding that wrongful-birth plaintiffs could recover ―damages for the 
parents‘ emotional injury caused by the birth of the defective child‖); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 
422–23 (Fla. 1992).  But see Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981) (Flaherty, J., concurring) 
(describing alleged injury in wrongful-birth case as ―mental distress at having to be the parent of a 
defective, diseased child‖). 
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directly on point—an opinion from a jurisdiction that, like New Hamp-
shire, recognizes a cause of action for wrongful birth, does not recognize a 
cause of action for wrongful life, bars the recovery of intangible damages 
for the emotional distress associated with raising a child disabled by a mis-
diagnosed pre-natal condition, but allows intangible damages for the emo-
tional distress associated with witnessing the birth of such a child.  I have 
found no such opinion.  On the other hand, I have found any number of 
creative approaches to allowing wrongful-birth plaintiffs to recover dam-
ages for their emotional distress.  In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
53
 the 
Washington Supreme Court analogized to the law applicable to parental 
recovery for the injury or death of a child.
54
  In Naccash v. Burger,
55
 the 
Virginia Supreme Court made an exception to the ―general rule‖ that 
―damages for emotional distress are not allowable unless they result direct-
ly from tortiously caused physical injury.‖56  In Kush v. Lloyd,57 the Florida 
Supreme Court held that ―public policy requires that the impact doctrine 
not be applied within the context of wrongful birth claims.‖58  And, in 
Bader v. Johnson,
59
 the Indiana Supreme Court held that a mother‘s ―con-
tinued pregnancy and the physical transformation of her body underwent as 
a result, satisfy the direct impact requirement of [Indiana‘s] modified im-
pact rule.‖60  While the opinions in Harbeson, Naccash, Kush, and Bader 
are all legally interesting, none of them are particularly useful as a basis for 
  
 53. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983). 
 54. Id. at 492–93; see also Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 320 (Idaho 1984). 
 55. 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982). 
 56. Id. at 831.  As the court explained, ―refus[ing] to recognize an exception to the general [impact] 
rule, ‗would constitute a perversion of fundamental principles of justice.‘‖  Id.  (quoting Berman v. 
Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979)). 
 57. 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1993). 
 58. Id. at 423. 
 59. 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000). 
 60. Id. at 1222.  While creative, the approach taken by the Bader court, which is more limited than 
that taken by the Naccash and Kush courts, suffered from one significant drawback, at least from the 
plaintiffs‘ point of view: 
Provided she can prevail on her negligence claim, we see no reason why Connie [the moth-
er] should not be able to claim damages for emotional distress.  By contrast, Ronald [the fa-
ther] did not suffer a direct impact as a result of Healthcare Provider‘s alleged negligence.  
We disagree with his argument to the contrary.  Rather, at most Ronald is a relative bys-
tander, a classification of potential victims this court has recently adopted in Groves v. Tay-
lor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 572–73 (Ind. 2000).  Whether Ronald can prevail on his claim for 
emotional distress damages depends on the evidence adduced at trial. 
Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1222 (Ind. 2000) (footnote omitted).  So, it seems that in Indiana, 
the father is left with only a Corso-type claim, but, presumably, for the emotional distress associated 
with witnessing the injury to his child‘s mother rather than the emotional distress associated with 
witnessing an injury to his child.  Bader is also noteworthy for the court‘s decision not to recognize a 
separate cause of action for wrongful birth, on grounds that medical malpractice was a fully sufficient 
theory of recovery for parents claiming damages resulting from negligent pre-natal care.  Id. at 1216. 
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allowing the damages Linda Smith sought for the emotional distress asso-
ciated with witnessing the birth of her daughter. 
While I have found no case directly on point, I have found the next 
best things: (1) a case in which the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed 
precisely the damages Linda Smith sought in her Corso claim, as opposed 
to undifferentiated emotional-distress damages encompassing those sought 
in both Counts I and II of the Smith action; (2) a case in which the Ala-
bama Supreme Court appears to have recognized the distinction between 
the two categories of emotional-distress damages and allowed only those 
associated with witnessing the birth of an unexpectedly disabled child; and 
(3) a case in which the Missouri Supreme Court expressly relied on the 
distinction between the two categories of emotional-distress damages. 
In Berman v. Allan,
61
 an opinion cited with approval in Smith, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court overruled Gleitman v. Cosgrove
62
 and held that ―a 
cause of action founded upon wrongful birth is a legally cognizable 
claim.‖63  At the same time, the Berman court reaffirmed Gleitman to the 
extent that decision declined to recognize a cause of action for wrongful 
life.
64
  While New Jersey has since adopted a cause of action for wrongful 
life, at the time Berman was decided, New Jersey and New Hampshire 
both recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth and both did not rec-
ognize a cause of action for wrongful life, thus enhancing the value of 
Berman as an analog to Smith.  Regarding damages for wrongful birth, the 
Berman court held that the ―medical and other expenses that will be in-
curred to properly raise, educate and supervise the child‖65 were not reco-
verable, reasoning as follows: 
 
In essence, Mr. and Mrs. Berman desire to retain all the benefits 
inhering in the birth of the child—i.e., the love and joy they will 
experience as parents—while saddling defendants with the enorm-
ous expenses attendant upon her rearing.  Under the facts and cir-
cumstances here alleged, we find that such an award would be 
wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved, and that al-
lowance of such a recovery would both constitute a windfall to the 
  
 61. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). 
 62. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). 
 63. Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. 
 64. Id. at 11–13.  Subsequently, in Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for wrongful life, but limited the damages available the-
reunder. 
 65. Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. 
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Thus, Berman and Smith reached different results on that particular meas-
ure of damages.
67
  The Berman court did, however, determine that emo-
tional-distress damages were recoverable: 
 
The parents‘ claim for emotional damages stands upon a dif-
ferent footing.  In failing to inform Mrs. Berman of the availability 
of amniocentesis, defendants directly deprived her—and, deriva-
tively, her husband—of the option to accept or reject a parental re-
lationship with the child and thus caused them to experience men-
tal and emotional anguish upon their realization that they had giv-
en birth to a child afflicted with Down‘s Syndrome.  We feel that 
the monetary equivalent of this distress is an appropriate measure 
of the harm suffered by the parents deriving from Mrs. Berman‘s 
loss of her right to abort the fetus. 
 
Unlike the Gleitman majority, we do not feel that placing a 
monetary value upon the emotional suffering that Mr. and Mrs. 
Berman have and will continue to experience is an impossible task 
for the trier of fact.  In the 12 years that have elapsed since Gleit-
man was decided, courts have come to recognize that mental and 
emotional distress is just as ―real‖ as physical pain, and that its 
valuation is no more difficult.  Consequently, damages for such 
distress have been ruled allowable in an increasing number of con-
texts.  Moreover, as discussed in Part II ante, to deny Mr. and Mrs. 
Berman redress for their injuries merely because damages cannot 
be measured with precise exactitude would constitute a perversion 




Not only did Berman hold that emotional distress is compensable, it ap-
pears to have limited the plaintiff‘s recovery to damages for the type of 
emotional distress identified in Linda Smith‘s Corso claim.  In that claim, 
Linda sought damages for ―the emotional injury, including depression, 
  
 66. Id. (citing Rieck v. Med. Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 244–245 (Wis. 1974); Coleman v. 
Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975)). 
 67. See Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 244–45, 513 A.2d 341, 349–50 (1986) (holding ―that a plain-
tiff in a wrongful birth case may recover the extraordinary medical and educational costs attributable to 
the child‘s deformities‖ including ―compensation for the extraordinary maternal care that has been and 
will be provided to the child‖). 
 68. Berman, 404 A.2d at 14–15 (internal citations omitted). 
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attributable to the impact of her observation of Heather‘s defects at and 
after Heather‘s birth.‖69  The injury in Berman was the parents‘ ―mental 
and emotional anguish upon their realization that they had given birth to a 
child afflicted with Down‘s Syndrome.‖70  And it was the monetary value 
of ―this distress,‖71 i.e., distress directly attendant to the birth of the plain-
tiffs‘ child, that the Berman court found to be an appropriate measure of 
the harm they suffered.
72
  Thus, when the court subsequently wrote of ―the 
emotional suffering that Mr. and Mrs. Berman have and will continue to 
experience,‖73 it seems to have been referring only to the emotional dis-
tress directly resulting from their perception of the birth of the child.  Ac-
cordingly, Berman provides relatively strong support for the proposition 
that the damages Linda Smith sought in her Corso claim can be recovered 
in a standard wrongful-birth action. 
Perhaps even more supportive is the Alabama Supreme Court‘s deci-
sion in Keel v. Banach,
74
 in which that court recognized a cause of action 
for wrongful birth
75
 and then went on to consider the question of damages.  
The plaintiffs sought damages for, among other things, ―the tremendous 
emotional suffering and mental anguish associated with day-to-day life 
with Justin which, they claim[ed], [were] natural and foreseeable conse-
quences of the injury they sustained.‖76  After holding that ―[e]motional 
distress suffered by the parents of an unhealthy child is compensable in a 
wrongful birth action,‖77 the court observed that 
 
[a] jury could conclude that the defendants, in failing to inform 
Mrs. Keel of the possibility of giving birth to a child with severe 
multiple congenital abnormalities, directly deprived her and, deri-
vatively, her husband, of the option to accept or reject a parental 
relationship with the child and thus caused them to experience 
mental and emotional anguish upon their realization that they had 






 69. Smith, 128 N.H. at 235, 513 A.2d at 343. 
 70. Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993). 
 75. Id. at 1029. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1030 (citing Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Blake v. Cruz, 698 
P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Naccash v. 
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983)). 
 78. Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1030 (emphasis added). 
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The court concluded by holding that, if proven, the ―mental and emotional 
anguish the parents have suffered‖79 is compensable.  Indulging in the pre-
sumption that the court chose its words with care, it would appear that the 
Keel plaintiffs were seeking the damages that Smith expressly disallows, 
i.e., damages for the emotional distress associated with raising a disabled 
child, and the Keel court determined those damages not to be compensable 
but, instead, ruled that wrongful-birth plaintiffs are entitled to seek the 
damages Linda Smith sought in her Corso claim, i.e., damages for the 
emotional distress resulting from her mental and emotional anguish at the 
moment of her daughter‘s birth. 
Finally, there is Shelton v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center.80  In that 
case, the plaintiff was a mother who gave birth to a child with congenital 
abnormalities after the defendants negligently interpreted the results of an 
ultrasound test and did not inform her that the child she was carrying had 
various detectable congenital defects.
81
  In the face of a state statute pro-
viding that ―[n]o person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an 
award of damages based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of 
another, a child would have been aborted,‖82 which, in effect, barred ac-
tions for wrongful birth, the mother brought a medical malpractice action.  
The court then had to determine whether the statutory wrongful-birth ban 
also barred plaintiff‘s medical malpractice claim: 
 
In determining the extent to which the statute bars plaintiff‘s 
claim, the allegations of her petition are to be liberally construed, 
allowing them their broadest intendment . . . .  Viewing the petition 
in this light, we hold that it states a viable claim of medical mal-
practice and thus should be reinstated to that extent.  The petition 
does not merely allege that ―but for the negligent conduct of 
another, a child would have been aborted,‖ § 188.130.2, but asserts 
that: 
[a]s a direct and proximate result of the negligence and care-
lessness of the defendants, . . . plaintiff was denied the right to 
choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy; and as a re-
sult thereof . . . plaintiff has suffered losses including loss of 
consortium, the right to lead a normal life; plaintiff has also 
suffered and will continue to suffer from emotional distress, 
anxiety and depression.  
  
 79. Id. 
 80. 781 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1989). 
 81. Id. at 48. 
 82. Id. at 49. 
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. . . 
The allegations of the petition state a breach of duty to inform 
the patient sufficiently to enable her to make a judgment, as well as 
damages flowing from such breach.  Such damages are readily se-
parable from damages arising from the possibility that but for the 
negligent conduct of defendants, the child would have been ab-
orted.  Plaintiff has alleged mental distress, and counsel asserts that 
some mental distress followed from the shock of discovering the 
defects in the baby at birth without being adequately advised of the 
deformities and prepared for this catastrophe.  Therefore harm is 
attributable to defendants‘ negligence regardless of whether plain-
tiff would have had an abortion, and the pleading states a viable 




In other words, the Missouri Supreme Court held that if the plaintiff had 
sought only damages for the emotional distress associated with raising a 
disabled child, her claim would have been barred by the anti-wrongful-
birth statute, but because her counsel asserted that some of her emotional 
distress resulted from ―the shock of discovering the defects in the baby at 
birth without being adequately advised of the deformities and prepared for 
this catastrophe,‖84 she had stated something more than a mere wrongful-
birth claim.
85
  Shock at the delivery of her unexpectedly disabled daughter 
  
 83. Id. at 49–50 (citations omitted).  See also Liddington v. Burns, 916 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Okla. 
1996).  In Liddington, Judge Miles-LaGrange ruled that while Oklahoma law barred wrongful-birth 
plaintiffs from recovering for negligent infliction of emotional distress for injuries to their children, id. 
at 1141, the plaintiffs in that case had not asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
but only a negligence claim, under which they were entitled to recover for the mental anguish they 
suffered on account of their own injury, i.e., ―being deprived of their right to decide whether to bear a 
child with a genetic or other defect,‖ id. at 1142. 
 84. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 50. 
 85. Shelton also had another interesting wrinkle concerning the date on which the plaintiff‘s cause 
of action accrued: 
  As § 188.130.2 [the anti-wrongful-birth statute] became effective in the midst of plain-
tiff‘s pregnancy, we must determine when plaintiff‘s cause of action accrued and thus 
whether the statute is applicable to her claim.  ―A cause of action accrues at the time when 
its owner may legally invoke the aid of a proper tribunal to enforce his demands; when he 
has a present right to institute and maintain an action or suit.‖  Brinkmann v. Common Sch. 
District # 27 of Gasconade County, 238 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. [Ct.] App. 1951), aff’d, 255 
S.W.2d 770 (Mo. banc 1953).  Even though plaintiff claims this is a medical malpractice ac-
tion for which the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the act of neglect, see § 
516.105, it appears on the face of her claim that the harm was not suffered until the child 
was actually born, and she therefore did not have the right to institute suit until that time.  At 
the time the child was born, § 188.130.2 was fully effective as a bar to the extent plaintiff‘s 
claim fell within its provisions. 
Id. at 49.  Had the court determined that the plaintiff‘s cause of action had accrued at the time of the 
defendants‘ negligent act, then it would not have been necessary for it to work so hard to cast her claim 
as one for medical negligence rather than wrongful birth. 
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is precisely the injury for which Linda Smith sought recovery in her Corso 
claim. 
In sum, Berman, Keel, and Shelton all stand for two propositions that 
would support Linda Smith‘s recovery for the emotional distress that re-
sulted from witnessing the birth of her daughter, even without a Corso 
claim.  The first proposition is that the emotional distress from witnessing 
the birth of an unexpectedly disabled child is separable from the emotional 
distress associated with raising that child.  And second, all three cases ex-
pressly allow the recovery of such damages.
86
 
While Berman, Keel, and Shelton demonstrate that wrongful-birth 
plaintiffs in New Jersey and Alabama and certain medical malpractice 
plaintiffs in Missouri can expect to recover the damages Linda Smith 
sought in Count II of her writ without making a Corso-type claim, those 
opinions do not establish that such damages should be available in New 
Hampshire.  But, as it turns out, the Smith decision itself points toward 
sturdy New Hampshire roots on which to engraft the reasoning of Berman, 
Keel, and Shelton. 
When deciding that wrongful-birth plaintiffs may not recover intangi-
ble damages for the emotional distress associated with raising a disabled 
child,
87
 the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on its previous decisions 
in Prescott v. Robinson
88
 and Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc.
89
  The 
Smith court described Prescott in the following way: 
 
In Prescott v. Robinson, a pregnant woman was injured in an au-
tomobile accident caused by the defendant‘s negligence.  Her child 
was subsequently born permanently deformed.  The woman 
brought an action for personal injuries in which she sought to re-
  
 86. While only Berman and Keel were actual wrongful-birth cases, given the Missouri Supreme 
Court‘s agile circumnavigation of that state‘s anti-wrongful-birth statute in Shelton, it is worth bearing 
in mind the Indiana Supreme Court‘s discussion of wrongful birth as a cause of action: 
Although a popular characterization among some commentators and a number of jurisdic-
tions the term ―wrongful birth‖ seems to have its genesis as a play upon the statutory tort of 
―wrongful death.‖  See Alexander M. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 618, 634 n.62 (1979).  However, as the Nevada Supreme Court observed, 
―we see no reason for compounding or complicating our medical malpractice jurisprudence 
by according this particular form of professional negligence action some special status apart 
from presently recognized medical malpractice or by giving it the new name of ‗wrongful 
birth.‘‖  Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (1995).  We agree.  It is unnecessary to 
characterize the cause of action here as ―wrongful birth‖ because the facts alleged in the 
Johnsons‘ complaint either state a claim for medical malpractice or they do not.  Labeling 
the Johnsons‘ cause of action as ―wrongful birth‖ adds nothing to the analysis, inspires con-
fusion, and implies the court has adopted a new tort. 
Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. 2000) (footnotes and parallel citation omitted). 
 87. Smith, 128 N.H. at 246–47, 513 A.2d at 350–51. 
 88. 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908). 
 89. 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984). 
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cover for the mental distress she had suffered and would continue 
to suffer on account of her child‘s condition.  We held that she 




Siciliano, in turn, was a case in which one child was injured and another 
killed on a carnival ride,
91
 and their parents asked the court ―to create a 
cause of action for parental loss of society of a minor child injured or killed 
as a result of negligent conduct.‖92  In reliance on Prescott and Siciliano, 
the Smith court turned to the issue before it: 
 
This case arises from a child‘s birth, not a child‘s injury or 
death.  Nonetheless, we are struck by the parallels between the 
claims for emotional distress in Prescott and Siciliano and the 
claim before us.  Moreover, we are mindful of the anomaly that 
would result were we to treat parental emotional distress as com-
pensable.  The negligent conduct at issue in Prescott and Robinson 
was the direct cause of injuries to or the death of otherwise healthy 
children.  By contrast, in wrongful birth cases the defendant‘s con-
duct results, not in injuries or death, but in the birth of an unavoid-
ably impaired child.  It would be curious, to say the least, to im-





The portion of Prescott on which the Smith court relied provides: 
  
 90. Smith, 128 N.H. at 246–47, 513 A.2d at 350–51 (internal citations omitted). 
 91. Siciliano, 124 N.H. at 723, 475 A.2d at 20. 
 92. Id. at 723, 475 A.2d at 21. 
 93. Smith, 128 N.H. at 247, 513 A.2d at 351.  In an opinion in which he ruled that wrongful-birth 
plaintiffs Jason and Keri Rich were entitled to recover intangible damages for their emotional distress, 
Judge Cremins of the Connecticut Superior Court criticized the above-quoted portion of the Smith 
decision: 
  In contrast, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned in Smith v. Cote, supra, at 513 
A.2d 351, that it would be illogical to allow damages for the parents‘ emotional distress in a 
wrongful birth case, when parents are not allowed to recover for emotional distress in a 
wrongful death action where the child‘s death is actually caused by the negligence of the 
physician. 
  Contrary to the Smith court‘s assertion, however, there is a logical distinction between 
these two situations.  A wrongful birth case involves emotional distress arising out of a rec-
ognized duty to the parents directly, while a wrongful death case involves a duty owed to 
the child.  Connecticut law, however, recognizes that in a wrongful birth case, the parents 
themselves have suffered a direct injury, by being deprived of the opportunity to choose to 
terminate the pregnancy.  Allowing the parents to recover for their emotional distress direct-
ly resulting from the defendants‘ breach of a duty owed to them is consistent with ―the nor-
mal duty of a tortfeasor to assume liability for all the damages that he or she has caused.‖ 
Rich v. Foye, No. X01UWYCV065003443S, 2007 WL 2702809, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2007) (quoting Burns v. Hanson, 734 A.2d 964, 969 (Conn. 1999)). 
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The fact that the plaintiff will undoubtedly suffer great disap-
pointment during her lifetime, occasioned by her continual obser-
vation of her child‘s deformity and its probable suffering, though 
in some sense caused by the defendant‘s negligence, is a misfor-
tune for which the law can afford no compensation in an action for 
negligence.  If the collision which caused the injury both to her 
and her child had occurred while she was carrying the child in her 
arms, it would be a novel proposition to urge that she might recov-
er damages for her subsequent mental distress on account of the 
disfigurement and ill health of the child.  However severe the grief 
may be of the friends and relatives of the victim of a catastrophe, 
they can ordinarily maintain no common-law action for damages 
on that account.  The deformity of a crippled child and its suffering 
may be an ever-present cause of disappointment to its parents, and 
their lives may be made miserable thereby, but they can obtain no 
redress on that ground against the person whose negligence was 
the cause of the child‘s condition.94 
 
While the foregoing passage seems to foreclose the availability of the in-
tangible emotional-distress damages Linda Smith sought in Count I, there 
is more to Prescott.  Before the Prescott court held that the plaintiff mother 
was not entitled to damages for the emotional distress associated with rais-
ing her child, it held that she could recover for the emotional distress she 
suffered at the time of her child‘s birth: 
 
The fact that one of the results of the alleged injury in this case 
was the deformity of the fœtus, which became the child‘s misfor-
tune upon its birth, does not prove that no right of the plaintiff [i.e., 
the mother] was invaded in this regard for which damages are al-
lowable.  On the contrary, it shows that her natural right to the 
normal action of her physical organs in the growth and develop-
ment of the fœtus was seriously infringed.  Her ability to be deli-
vered of a normal and healthy child was jeopardized, and her grief 
and apprehension before the birth on account of what the probable 
or not unreasonable effect would be upon the child is not a remote 
consequence of the alleged negligence of the defendant.  It was her 
right to produce a healthy child; and, if by the defendant‘s negli-
gence her enjoyment of that right was diminished or violated, her 
  
 94. Prescott, 74 N.H. at 464–65, 69 A. at 524–25 (citing Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 197 
(1867)). 
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mental distress for the unnatural result to be expected was an ele-
ment of damage for which she should be compensated, as well as 




Obviously, the deformity in Prescott and the disabilities in wrongful-birth 
cases are caused in very different ways.  But, the ―right to produce a 
healthy child‖ in Prescott is but a small step removed from the right that 
has been violated in a typical wrongful-birth case, the right not to produce 
an unhealthy child, when the child‘s ill health stems from a pre-natal con-
dition that an obstetrician operating within the prevailing standard of care 
should have diagnosed and discussed with the mother.  More importantly, 
more than seven decades before Berman, Keel, and Shelton were decided, 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Prescott, distinguished between the 
emotional distress associated with raising a disabled child and the emo-
tional distress associated with witnessing the birth of a disabled child.  In 
light of the Smith court‘s rejection of the former category of damages, the 
distinction between the two categories is a necessary prerequisite for judi-
cial recognition of a wrongful-birth plaintiff‘s right to recover for the latter 
category, i.e., the damages Linda Smith sought in Count II of her writ.  
Based on Berman, Keel, and Shelton, as presaged by Prescott, a rather per-
suasive argument could be made for allowing wrongful-birth plaintiffs to 
  
 95. Id. at 462–63, 69 A. at 523 (internal citation omitted).  In the context of wrongful life, several 
courts have declined to recognize ―the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional 
human being.‖  Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); see also Moores v. Lucas, 405 
So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1979)).  While those opinions might appear to call into question the Prescott court‘s determina-
tion that the plaintiff in that case had a ―right to produce a healthy child,‖ it seems difficult to argue 
with the proposition that a pregnant woman has a right to produce a child free from injuries inflicted on 
the child while in utero. 
  The Prescott court noted that its result was ―not in conflict with cases cited by the defendant in 
which it has been held that no recovery could be had by the mother for the miscarriage and death of a 
child.‖  74 N.H. 463–64, 69 A. at 524.  As the court explained: 
These cases do not decide that the mother‘s solicitude consequent upon the injury and be-
fore the birth is not an element of her damage, but that the death of the child and her loss of 
the comfort and enjoyment of the company of a living child are too remote consequences to 
be considered by a jury in assessing her damages.  1 Joyce, Dam. § 185.  In Bovee v. Dan-
ville, 53 Vt. 190, the decision is stated thus: ―The plaintiff was entitled to recover all dam-
ages that were naturally and legitimately consequent upon the negligence of the town.  If the 
violence done her person resulted in the miscarriage, the miscarriage was a legitimate result 
of such negligence.  Any physical or mental suffering attending the miscarriage is a part of 
it, and a proper subject of compensation.  But the rule goes no farther.  Any injured feelings 
following the miscarriage, not part of the pain naturally attending it, are too remote to be 
considered an element of damage.‖  But injured feelings and regret before the birth and 
while the mother is seeking to perform her function of childbearing through the organs of 
her body may be proper elements of recoverable damage . . . . 
Id. at 464, 69 A. at 524 (citations omitted). 
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recover the damages Linda Smith sought in Count II without having to 
resort to a Corso claim. 
If I were arguing before the New Hampshire Supreme Court that a 
wrongful-birth plaintiff should be allowed to recover intangible damages 
for the emotional distress associated with witnessing the birth of an unex-
pectedly disabled child, carried to term after the mother had received neg-
ligent pre-natal care, I would make the following points.  The availability 
of such damages is an open question, due to Linda Smith‘s strategic bifur-
cation of her claims for emotional-distress damages.  The separation of 
emotional distress into two categories, emotional distress caused by wit-
nessing the birth of an unexpectedly disabled child and emotional distress 
caused by raising that child, did not begin with Linda Smith, but, in New 
Hampshire, goes back to Prescott.  At least three other states have drawn a 
similar distinction, and have decided that a parent‘s emotional distress di-
rectly associated with the moment of birth of an unexpectedly disabled 
child is compensable.  The courts so ruling have generally based their deci-
sions on traditional tort principles,
96
 which the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court recognized as a basis for its decision in Smith.
97
  Finally, a decision 
allowing such damages would work no greater an expansion on wrongful-
birth liability than Corso worked on negligence liability.  This is so be-
cause a parent present at and cognizant of the birth of a child with recog-
nizable birth defects, after having been assured of the child‘s normal 
health, is no more remote from the cause of the resulting emotional distress 
than a parent ―witness[ing] or contemporaneously sensorially perceiv[ing] 
a serious injury to [his or her] child.‖98  The rule of recovery I would pro-
pose is this:  A parent asserting a meritorious wrongful-birth claim is en-
titled to recover both tangible and intangible damages for serious mental 
and emotional harm that is accompanied by objective physical symptoms 
and that was caused by learning about his or her child‘s unexpected dis-
abilities by direct observation at the moment of delivery. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
My conclusion is two-fold, and consists of a substantive component 
and a cautionary tale.  Substantively, while it is apparent that Corso does 
not provide a wrongful-birth plaintiff with a vehicle for recovering for the 
emotional distress associated with witnessing the birth of an unexpectedly 
  
 96. See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029–30 (Ala. 1993); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14–
15 (N.J. 1979). 
 97. See Smith, 128 N.H. at 239–44, 513 A.2d at 346–49. 
 98. Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979). 
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disabled child, such relief would appear to be available, without recourse 
to a parental-bystander theory, based upon the foundation laid in New 
Hampshire law by Prescott. 
My substantive conclusion is, necessarily, targeted at potential wrong-
ful-birth plaintiffs, but my subsidiary conclusion—my cautionary tale—
may have broader utility.  The litigation of Smith is a good reminder of the 
power that is held by the attorneys who frame the questions that courts 
decide.  While Linda Smith‘s strategy of seeking emotional-distress dam-
ages under two different theories was a wise attempt to spread the risk of 
an unfavorable decision in a new and unsettled area of the law, her deci-
sion to seek damages under Corso was not without its own risks.  With 
Corso, Linda Smith was able to rely on a ready-made theory of recovery 
that had previously been adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  
But, as I have shown here, a court could quite reasonably rule that wrong-
ful-birth plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain a Corso claim because their 
children have not been injured, which means that they were not parental 
bystanders to an injury.  The problem with Linda Smith‘s Corso claim is 
that it unnecessarily limited her chances of recovery by giving the court a 
question it could easily answer in the negative, i.e., whether Linda Smith 
was a bystander to an injury to her daughter, without ever addressing her 
real question, i.e., whether she, as a wrongful-birth plaintiff, was entitled to 
recover intangible damages for the emotional distress that resulted from 
witnessing the birth of her unexpectedly disabled daughter.  A court could 
well answer that question in the affirmative.  But, as a general rule, courts 
only answer the questions presented to them.
99
  Thus, in this area of the 
law as in any other, it is important for attorneys to bear in mind the power 
they hold as the framers of the questions courts decide. 
  
 99. See, e.g., Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140, 114748 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(―It is our responsibility to answer the question fairly presented to us by the litigants, not one we might 
prefer they asked.‖). 
